The issue of scientific and technological innovation is not new for the legal arena. Ever since the industrial revolution, scientific progress has been so fast that the law has often been late in responding to new technological challenges. lndeed, as Weeramamry has pointed out, 'inventions are piling up at a rate which far outpaces the possibilities of legal control. The law is not ready with the appropriate annory of new concepts to challenge these new weapons of intrusion.'1 This is particularly true for 'new technologies', the progress of which, especial!y in recent years, is faster and more difficult to regulate compared to 'traditional technologies'. In the COntext of the present contribution, the emphasis will be on legal responses to risks posed by new technologies. Ir is accepted however that new technologies may also bting benefits and pose new opportunities-'
Laurmc< Bollion tk Chazoumtf
Science makes action possible, narnely in the form of new technologies, but onen science is unable to predict the collareral effecrs of actions with suffieient cenainty. Human creativity does not seem ta have limits. As it has been said, 'nos pouvoirs exâdent notre savoir'.3 For international law. this prerucament ficst appeared with respect co nuclear acrivities and then in the environmental area and the field of biorechnology. International law has ro /àce conrrasting values: on the one band the inrerests ofhumanity and of future generations as served by environmenca1 protection, respect for human righlS, and sovereigruy ovec naruraI resouroes; on the other hand, freedom of scientifie research, free trade, and the prorection of intellecrual propercy righrs.· The International Coun of Justice (ICJ) has poinrcd our this dialecrie of values in the inremarionallegal order:
Throughout the ag~, mankind bas, for econonUc and other reasons, conswnly Înterfered. The management of risks deriving from new technologies. however, requires a new approaeh bascd on uncertainty and foture rorots. New legal rools, mechanisrns, ru/es, and principles are thus needcd ta face the specifie challenges posed br those risks. These innovative legal concepts go beyond the simple prevention or
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reduction of present and weO-knoum risks foreseen in traditional intemationallaw to encompass a OeY{ rationaJe, ie mat of precaution.
The present contribution will focus, fust, on dte definition of dte notion of precaution and its constitutive elements. and will analyse the manner in which dte precautionary approach brings new coneerns and new paradigms into dte internationallegal order. Precaution's interwoven links widt public panicipation will dten be developed in Pan 2, particularly as dtey involve dte norions of risk assessme.nt. risk management, and risk communication. The chaprer will conc1ude in Parr 3 widt remarks on dte socieral dimension of precaurion.
Risks and International Law: The Virtues of Precaution
Precaution srans from dte prentise dtat dte absence of scienrific certainry should not be used as a prerext to postpone decisions if dtere is a risk of serious or irreversible damage to dte environment or to public healdt. Precaution is a key concept in international sustainable development law and is increasingJy penecrating dte area of human rights and healdt. A commonly given definition of dte precautionary principle/approach 6 is dte one contained in the 1992 Rio Declararion on Environment and Development. Ir reads as follows:
. ln order to protect the enVÎIonmcnc, the precautionasy approach shall be widely applied by Statt':S according to dtcir capabilities. Where there are rnrears of serlous or irreversible damage. bdc of full scienrific certainry shall Dot he uscd as a reason for posrponing COS(-effective measures to prevent environmental degradacion. 7 The Rio Oeclararion on Environment and Development played a pioneering role in dte process of crystallizing dte concept of precaution in international law.
Precaution tends ro deCy standard or dassicallegal assumptions. Ir is in essence a meta-Iegal principle, allowing legal provisions to incorporate considerations beyond dtose resulring /Tom strictly positive law' White dtese characteristics endow dte precautionary ptinciple widt a certain originaliry, they also determine dte complexiry of its analysis.
A. Precaution and International Law
Law has long becn a reOeerion of Cartesianism and positivism, dominant schools of dtought of modem times. New challenges con/Tonted by humaniry as a whole • 6 ln t.his chapler, the femlS 'the precautionary principle', 'me precautionary approach', and 'precaution' will lx used interch.angably. NCONF.151126. vol I. ano", I, 1992. and trepidation sparked by technological progress have led ro a questioning of legal Canesianism and of what has been described as 'Euclidian law'! This revolution did not take place directly within the legal system, but teSulted /Tom the remodelling of both philosophical and scientific thought. On the philosophicallevel, 'the heuristics of fear', devdoped by Hans Jonas,l. pioneered the process of reflection on Out interaction with the world, with science and with humanity. Major catastrophes (Chemobyl) and unoertainties (the consequences of climate change) have led ro the definition and assessment of other parameters of scare action in the international sphere. In this sense, precaution is a tooi jockeying tO be included in the new understanding of human relations to the environment in the intemationallega1 order. This order uses precaution as a [001 to <jurirucize' these new concc::rns. International law cannot ignore precaution.
Precaution /aVOutS the emergence of new paradigms that conttibute to the development of a global tisks govemanoe regime. These paradigms are those of uncenainry, interdependence. and anticipation. Precaution chus influences the philosophy of law in its entirety.
Precaution and the New Paradigms of International Law (a) Regulating uncertainty
The precautionary apptoach developed fullowing conoerns over the regulation of uncertain ecological phenomena. T raditionally, intemationallaw has been based on the dogmas of Canesian rationality. As a result, only those phenomena characterized by a certain scientific certainty were addressed by international cegulation.
When the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was adopted in 1985, the extent and the nature of the hurnan impact on the ozone layer wece largely shrouded in uncertainty.1I In the same vein, scientific uncertainty was widely prevalent in 1992 when ewo of the key multilareral environmental agreements were opened for signarure in Rio, narnely the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity.1 2 9 Timsit. 'Pour une nouvdJe définition de la nonne ' (1988) Secondly, a precautionary approach also presumes a flexible and open-ended view of law. T raditionally, international law is based on a sttaight and focused form of legal reasoning that makes it difficult to consider emerging and interconnected issues. Precaution, on the omer hand, as a technique of managing uncertainty is very different from any notion of a finite law. It is built upon a foundation that alIows adjustrnent and openness. The procedutal technique of developing a frarnework convention that is later complemented by the adoption of additional protocols addressing the progression of scientifie knowledge fàcili- 15 For instance, the Preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity carries an explicitly anticipatory message: 'Noting that it i5 vital to anticipate, prevent and maok the causes of signiJicant reduction or loss of biological diversity at source' (empbasis added). Precaution rejecrs a curative legal approach. Given mat it is flot characterized by a curative logi~ precaution differs in many aspeets from the polluter pays principle which is closely linked te compensation for environmental damage. Funhermore, precaution does not depend simply on a cause and effect relationship. Precaution goes beyond the principle of prevention which ries action CO scientific certitude. This need for anticipation is addressed in legal systems through the precautionary principle.
B. Precaution: A Means for law to Address New Conoems Precaution i5 a tool for introducing new values into the internationallegal system, which essentially lead to new modes of thought (1) and of action (2).
The ]uridicization' of a New Mode of Thought: Complexity
The new thought method to which intemationallaw refers when it incorporates a precautionary approach is that of complexity, or, to quote Edgar Morin, chat of 'complex thOught'.16 What constirutes complexity? The idea of a complex and temporary order bas replaoed chat of a determinism clear, simple, universal, and eternal. l ? Considering precaution as 'the law of complexity' highlights twO of its substantive charaeter traits: uncenainty and globality. I8 Unoettainty, because taking into account complexity comes precisely /tom the refusal of a simplistic approach. Precaution is therefore 'the law of uncettainty', hostile to l' On the concept of scientmc uncertainty, see infra-
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Being the law of complexity, precaution is also the 'Iaw of globality'. Precaution as a legal technique presents irself as an appropriate and adequate path IOr the administration of common goods and spaoes. The uncerrainty of the potential consequences of a state's actions on the well-being of omer societies requires the elaboration of global strategies for the management of these common spaoes. In the environmental field, in which precaution finds its ptincipal application, the concrete issues at stake in terms of international relations ohen ex:tend beyond the borders of states and regional groupings. Such is the case in relation to climate change, protection of biodiversity, deforestation processes, and use of shared naruta! resources, especially hesh water resources.
Th, Juridicization' of a New Mode of Action: Anticipation
In substance, precaution obeys a parricular ratione tempori process. The legal temporality to which precaution refers is the n.rure. In rhis, it is 'the law of anticipation'. The logic of precaution, centered essentially on the uncerrainry of the effccts of human activity, highlights the necessity to take ioto accouot the n.rure and polential effects of rhis activity. Precaution anticipates in that it sedts to govem situations that have not yel arisen. Therefore it is not a body of law lOcused on the concept of reacrion. Precaution as a legal technique therefore guatantees the right to anticipation in the internationallegal system. The dogmas of objecrivism and realism have often led law in genetal and intemationallaw in particular to ignore a large portion of the legal temporality-the n.mre--taking into account exclusively the past and the present.
2I
As a law of anticipation, precaution is a fortiori a manifestation of <me law of prospective'. Ir even adds a touch of originaIity by raising the dimension of uncenainty lO the starus of a fundamental element of consideration in the elaboration of any public or private prospective policy.
As a resuIt, the stages of thought and action in the precautionary approach are approach. The uncerraincy of the spatial extent of the analysed phenomena requires global anticipation-thar is, not ignoring the potenrial implications of a phenomenon in omer spaoes, or IDose of one system on others. Precaution caUs for the re-examination of the notion of sparial sovereigncy as skerched by ttaditional international law, and puts empbasis on a need for a special ',erritorialization' in a global contex[. Precaution is not a volatile notion in inoemationallaw. On the conuary. internationallaw, in order to guarantee legal secwicy and predietabilicy, seeks tO identifY criteria permitting the durable establishment of the legal content of precaution.
C. The Notion of Precaution: IdentiJYing the Criteria of Definition Precaution bas fOur fundamental criteria, which deline it as weU as justifY ratUme materiae its application in given situations. These criteria endow il wirh a parrieulat srructlue, an original basis compated '0 other principles or apptOaches of intemationallaw. Three of these criteria (risk, damage, and scientifie uncertaincy) justilY the application of precaution a priori, whereas the las, eritmon (capacities) intervenes a posteriori to objeetively de,ermine its applicabilicy, permitting the passage /Tom 'application' [Q 'applicabüicy', /Tom 'desitabilicy' tO 'feasibilicy'. time it will take for the damage to occur. Th"", risks should be eliminated by the principle of prevention .
The 'Risk' Criterion
• 'Residual' risks, those inherent to normal human activity that must be tolerated (eg the risk implicit in dtiving a car or taking a plane). Th"", risks, which 'rest on purely speculative considerations without any scientific foundation', do not need ro he taken into account in the decision~making process. 24 In order to avoid situations wh.ich would be absurd for human activity, residual risks have to be exduded from the precautionaty principle's range of application .
• 'Uncenain' risks, whose existence has not been established by science, but cannot be disntissed. These must be addressed by the precautionaty principle. The Cartagena Protocol goes funher by identifYing a methodology for the risk assessment of risks deriving from modem biotecbnology. Annex III of the Protocol emphasizes the importance of precaution by making dear that 'The process of risk assessment may on the one hand give tise to a need for funher information about specifie subjects, whicb may be identified and requested during the assessment process, while on the other hand information on omer subjects may not he relevant in sorne instances.' Risk assessment is based on the following steps:
1) An itkntification of any nove! genotypie and phenotypic characteristics associated with the living modified organism that may have adverse effects on biological ruversity in the like!y potential receiving environment, taking a1s0 into account risks ta hurnan health.
2) An roa/uation of the /ikelihood of these adverse efficts being realized, taking inta account the leve! and kind of exposure of the likely potential receiving environ ment to the living modified organism. 3) An roa/uation of the consequences should these adverse effects he realized. 4) An e1timation of the ovmlll risk posed by the living modified organism based on the evaluation of the likelibood and consequences of the identified adverse efIècts heing reaIized. and management of the risks to human health associated with the use of virginiamycin as a growth promo,er, as weU as in their application of the precautionary principle.
Le, us recaU tha< the Preamble '0 the conres,ed regulation shows that the European Council, in adopting the measure, took the viewthat the use of virginia<nycin as an additive in feedingstuffs involved a risk to hurnan health and that, accordingly, it was necessary to withdraw the aumorizations to use the product 31 Beth patties to the dispute admitted that, at the rime of the adoption of the conrested regulation, neither the reality nor the seriousness of the risk had been scientificaUy proven. Ir was agains, that background tha, the Council relied on the precautionary principle as justification fOr adopting the regulation.
Plizer did not dispute tha" in principle, the Community institutions may cake preventive measures if, foUowing a risk assessmem, i, is found tha, the use of an antibiotic, such as virginiamycin, as a growth promoter in animals involves a risk of a transfer of antimicrobial resistance &om animais to humans and, consequently, of a reduction in the effectiveness of certain medicinal productS used in human medicine for the treatment of dangerous infections. However, Pfizer maintained that the Communiry institutions did no' correctly assess tha, risk, and argued essentiaUy tha, these institutions had made theu decision for reasons of political expediency without a proper scientific basis. For Plizer:
the Communicy institutions must show mat the risk, although it has not actu.ally become a rea1ity, is nevertbeless probable. The existence of a very remote risk should he allowed given the concrete positive ekments arising from the use of the product conoemed. In any event, the Community 32 The CouncU of the European Union considered for ilS parr tha, the contes,ed regula<ion was adopted on the basis of an adequate assessment of the scientific knowledge available at the rime of its adoption. The CouncU conlirmed that any such measure withdrawing authorization canno' he based on a ,est desctibed as zero risk. However, the bct mat the competent authorities had, at a given rime, considered that a patticular additive meets the conditions fOr au,horization and have therefore authorized it does not imply tha, ,he manufàcturer is &eed from 
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me onus of proving that its product continues to meer such conditions. In the view of the Council:
Scientilic knowledge and the risks to hwnan heah:h associated with we of a particWar prooucr evolve. Consequencly, when fàced with new sdencific evidence mat the use of an additive poses a hazard to public health and that the hazard has =ched alarming proportions sincc the additive was ficst aumorized, the Communiry institutions are fully enritled [0 requite the manufacturtr in question ro demonstrate mat its product conrinues Dot ta represent a risk to human health. 33 The Court of Fi"t Instance, in a very imeresting and detalled dicrum, explained the purpose of a risk assessment in = where the precautionary principle hnds application:
lt is appropriatt ro bear in rnind that, as the Coun of Justice and the Coun of Ficst Instance have beJd, wbere mere is scienti.6.c uncertainty as [0 the existence or eneor of risks to human healcb, the Communicy instirutiollS may, by rea50n of the precaucionary principle, take prote<:tive IDeasUles without having to wait unru the realily and seriousness of those risks become fully app<trent ... Ir follows) 6m, mat as a resuJt of the precaudonary principle, as enshrined in Article 130r(2) of me T reaty, the Community institutions were cnritled to wc a preventive measure: regarding the use of virginiamycin as an additive in feedin""ruffi, even though, owing ro cxisting sci<ntific unoenainry, the realiry and the seriousness of che risks to human health associued with mat use were nor yel" fully apparent. A fortiori, the Community institutions were not required, for the purpose of taking preventive action, to wait for the adverse efFeas of the use of the produC( as a growth promoter to marerialize ... TIu!.';) in a situ.uion in which the precautionary principle is applied, wh.ich by ddinition coincides with a situation in which there is seientil1c uncertainty. a risk assessmem cannot be required tO provide the Community institutions with conclusive sdentrnc evidence of the realîcy of the risk and the seriownes.s of the potential adverse effects were thar risk to become a rc:ality ... However, it is also clear From the case-law that a preventive rneasure cannot properly he based on a purely hypothetical approach ro the risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not becn scientifical1y verified'" And the Court of First Instance wenr on to conclude that The precautionary principle cm therefore apply only in situations in which there is a risk, notably to human health, which) although it is Dot founded on mere hypomeses that have not been scientificaUy confirmoo, has not yer becn fully demonstrated. ln sum a siruatwn, risk mus constitutes a function of IDe probabiliry m.at use of a product or a procedure will adversely affect the interes" safeguarded by the legal otder. Hazard (danger) is, in rhis context, commonly used in a broader sense and describes any product or procedure capable ofhaving an adverse effecr on human health (see in mat regard, at an international level) the provisional communication from the Codex Alimentarius CommÏlSion of [he Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Health Organization, ex 2/20, CL 1996/21-GEN, lune 1996). Consequently, in a case such as this, the purpose of a risk assessment is to assess the degree of probability of a cenain product or procedure having adverse effecrs on human health and the seriousness of any such adverse effecrs. 35 
The 'Damage' Critcrion
Once the decision-maker has an idea of the likelihood of occurrence of the suspected risk, he will naruraIly reflect on the possibilities of shidding himsdf from it. Must this tisk be reduced or even eliminated regardless of the importance or severity of damage it could provoke? Or on the COllrrary, is intervention required only if what is at srake is worrh the eflOrr? His attitude is obviously subject to variations accorrling to the probabiliry of occurrence and especially ro the importance of damage.
The terminology used to denote damage in international instnunents varies. Reference can be made rlirectly to the concept of damage. 36 Sorne instruments refee to the concept of <impact'. 37 In spite of these terminological variations, the formulation of precaution in international instruments embodies an original, if not special, concept of damage. The larrer is usually bound ro a threshold of severiry, which Iimits the applicarion of the precautionary principle. This threshold usually invokes concepts sucb as 'severiry' and 'irreversibiliry'. The 'damage' criterion is an important element of the definition of precaution, even thougb it is inrrinsically linked to the risk criterion.
The 'Scier/tifle Uncertainty' Critcrion
(a) Content and meaning of the criterion Whenever precaution is formulated in an international instrument, the criterion of scientific uncenainty is bound to it. The clement of uncertainty is a sine qua non conrlirion to the application and even to the legitimacy of the precaurionary principle. 38 Indeed, the larrer r1iffers from the principle of prevention precisely in its reference to the aIOrementioned clement. The 'preventive model' is forced to depend constantly on science and its expertise, the only way to allow for a certain As will he dabo .. oed helow, dUs means rhat a pand has to derermine wherher an SPS measurc 15 sufficiendy supponed or reasonably warramed br the risk assessment. 46 The WTO Appellate Body bas abstained so fur from pronouncing irself on rhe imponing Member could justifY an inconsistency wirh an applicable obligation, it would, in our view, have been more narural and appropriate to use the teon 'exception' ramer than the term 'exemption', as the term 'exemption' connotes freedom from, and hence inapplicability of, an obligation. 48 Other elements militate in favour of an application of precaution in the creacment of risk by the WTO.49 The Pane! in the Asbestos case admitted that it is not possible to require a leve! of absolute certainty from a Member who wishes co invoke Anicle XX of the GATT:
to make the adoption of health measures conceming a definite risk depend upon establishing with certainty a risk ... would have the effect of preventing any possibility of legislating in the field of public health. 50
The interpretation of the scope of risk assessment by the WTO dispute settlement bodies has also given space to the acceptance of a precautionary treaunent of risk in the WTO framework. 
The 'Diffirent Capacities' Criterion
The risk, damage, and scientific uncertainty criteria would a priori juswy the application of the precautionary principle. But a certain number of international instruments stipulate that measuteS of precaution apply a posteriori according to the concemed states' capacities to deal with the problem. Acknowledging capacity permits one to relate the precautionary principle to a propottional approach in Iight of astates econontic, social, and technological means. Pr<:cautionary measures do not aim to paralyze human acUvity. A measure of rationality and reason must guide the application of p",caution. Ir is obvious that states at different stages of development cannot be submitted to the same requirements. A fortiori, precautionary measures cao therefore he expected to vary from one state te anorner.
The Precautionary Principle and Public Participation
The precautionary principle does not stand atone, but is interwoven with omer international law norms and principles. This is the case in regard ro the principle of public participation. The Iink between public participation and the 53 This principle benelits from the dynamism implicit in the precautionary principle. The management of the uncenainry linked to human activiry must not become sole!y the prerogative of public decision-makers. The precautionary principle upsets ttaditional decision-making processes by requiring increased ttansparency. Precaution considered as the symbiosis of technical, scientilic, social, economic, cultural, political, and legal norms involves a pluraliry of agents. T 0 do 50, the implementation of the precautionary prindple must give rise ro an effective and efficient application of the principle of public participation. The stare cannot be the only agent responsible for the evaluation of whether precaution should be applied in a particular situation. Scientists, companies, NGOs, local populations, and other concerned agents must participate in the decisionmaking process. In addition, adequate inlOnnation as a COtoUary to participation guaranrees a transparent decision-making process. As said by Marie-Angèle Hermine, the precautionary principle is the bearer of 'a subversive capaciry for the whole of the legal order and leads the way to democratic renewal'.57
A, Access to Information, Public Participation, and There are differem ways of stimulating a pubüe debate; there are no prefixed rtÙes on this matter. However, what can he Stated is that access to infonnation and panticipation in the relevant decision-making processes are two impor<ant pillars for a meaningful social debate co take place and have been identified as such under intemationallaw. Their satisbction relates to the legitimacy of a decisionmaking process and its sound implementation.
The precautionary principle does not prescribe a cotally resuietive approach, nor does it allow for a totally pennissive approach co the regtÙation of new technologies. Ir requiTes an approach somewhere in between: rempering the permissive approaeh through the taking into acrount of risks which are uncert:lin. This pennits a sound decision to be made base<! on adequate risk assessment.
Poliric The public should he able ro express its viewpoint a' both me risk assessmenr and risk managemen, srages. This is foreseen mrough the concep' of risk communication, a crucial ,001 for providing infonnation about risks. In this regard, it is no,ewonhy <ha, the AppeUare Body in the Asbestos case implicirly acknowledged the role of the viewpoinr of the consumers:
We consider it likely (hat the presence of a /mown cardnogen in one of the productS would bave an influence on consumers' tasteJ and IMhits regarding that product. We believe this w be uue irrespective of whether the consumer of the cement-baud prooucrs is a commercial pany, such as a construction company, or is an individual, for inscance, a doit-yoursdf ('DIV') enthusiast or someone who owns or lives or works in a building. This influence may weU vary, but the possibiliry of such an influence should not be averlooked by a pand when considering the 'likeness' of products conwning chrysotite asbesws-. . . We consider it likdy that the presence of a Imown carcinogen in one of the products will bave an influence on consumers' tastes and habits regarding mat product. h may be. modified organisms (GMOs), considere.! as producrs that pose cerrain potential risks. Ir esrablishes strict procedures aimed at regulating the imernational trade of GMOs. Annex III of me said instrument provides for an assessmem of me scientific uncertaimies wim respect to a GMO product. 61 The Protocol comains provisions on access to information. Article 20 provides fur an 'Advance Informed Agreemem' (AJA) procedure. The most rigorous procedures are reserved for GMOs that are to be introduced intentionally into me environment. These include GM Os mat are destined to grow and mat have me potential to pass meir modified genes on to succeeding generations. Under me AJA procedure, the exporter stacts by giving the govemment of me importing country detailed written infurmation, including a description of me organism, in advance of me shipment. The competent national aumorities of the importing country aclcnowledge receipt of this information within 90 days and then explicidy aumorize the shipment within 270 days or srate meir reasons for rejecting it.
The AJA procedure enahles recipient countries to assess risks mar may be associated wim a GMO befure agreeing to impott it. The AJA procedure does not apply to GMOs in transit through a country, GMOs destined for contained use (in a scientific laboratory for exarnple), or to GMOs to be direcdy used as food or animal feed or fur processing. A country may, however, under irs domestic regulatory framework, and consistendy wim the objective of me Protocol, decide to subject such GMOs to risk assessment and other requirements. 
Ri.sk Communiclltitm:
The interactive exchange of information and opinions throughour the risk analysis process concerning risk, risk-rdated factors and risk percepr:ioru, among risk assessors, risk managea, consumers, indusay, the academic coDUnunity and othee interesred parties, induding ,he explanation of risk assessment findings and the bas;' of risk management decisions. 64 The notion of risk analysis includes inter aIia uses, cost!benefit analysis, appropriateness of the measure, proportionaliry, preventive measures co avoid the uncertain risk, and risk communication) risk rommwlÏcation covering interactive exchanges among the most im(X>rtaIu stakeholders. These proccsses are not sequential, but rather iterative and interdependenr and have becn construed co require adoption in a muruaUy supportive way. At the levd of risk management, the Prooedural Manual refers to the notion of 'other legitimate &ctors relevant for tbe hea/th protection of consumers and ror the promotion of f.ùr pracrioes in food trade.'6' This leaves room for the elaboration of international standards and guidelines re8ecting those 'orber legitimate fuctor. (v) only those other factors which can be accepted on a world-wide basis, or on a regional basis in the case of regional standards and related texts, should he taken mto account in the framework of Codex;
(vi) the consideration of specifie other fuctors in the development of risk management recommendations of me Codex Alimentarius Commission and its suhsidiary bodies should he c1early d.ocwnented., induding the raoonale fur their integracion, on a case-by-case basis; (vü) the feasihility of risk management options due to the narure and panïcular COfistraints of the production or processing methods, transport and storage, especially in developing countries, may he considered; concerns related to economic interests and uade issues in general should he substantiated by quantifiable data;
(vüi) the integraoon of other legitimate factors in risk management should not create unjustified barriers to trade; particular attencion should be given ta the impact on devdoping cauntries of the inclusion of such other factors. 66 The concept of risk analysis, and in particular risk communication, requires funher refinement. Two of its main facets are the right to access to information and the right to participate in the relevant decision-making processes as provided for by the Aarhus Convention. This Convention is analysed in the following section.
B. The Aarhus Convention and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)
The 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Acoess to Justice in Environmental Matters 67 (hereinafter the 'Aarhus Convention') CQvers not only cenain, but also unoenain risks deriving from hwnan activities and the use of technologies in the environmenta! area. The Aarhus Convention was adopted undet the auspices of the United N arions Economie Commission for Europe, which means mar irs membership is significantly more limircd man the previous instruments mentioned. Thar said, the links established betWeen public patticipation and GMOs are irnpottant 10 assess, as they reveal sorne of the social contours of the precautionary principle.
The Pillars of the Aarhus Convention
The main goal of the Aarhus Convention, as enunciated in Article l, is '10 contribute 10 the protection of the right of every petson of present and future generations to live in an environ ment adequate to bis or her health and wellheing.' For this putpose, the Convention enunciates three substantive pillatS:
(1) the right of aceess to envitonmenta! information; (2) the right to public participation in environmenta! decision-making; and (3) the creation of admin- in accordance with Article 6, para 7, to submit comments, information, analysis, or opinions consideroo as relevant for the concernoo decision-making process. The contours of the access to infurmation and publie participation pillars with respect to GMOs have thus been specilied and have given rise to a specifie regime whereby, in comparison to other new technologies, more infonnation and public participation are required. Given that GMOs have been dealt with through the Canagena Ptotocol in a way chat acknowledges scientific uncertainties .and the The importance of public participation in the management of environmental and sanirary risks deriving from technologies was also at scake in the Methanex case. 78 One reason for the Tribunal' s dismissal of Methanex' s daims was based on the scienti6c evidence produoed by a Repon of the Vniversiry of California (hereinafrer the 'VC Repon'). In its Awanl, the Tribunal recaUed chat public hearings on the VC Repon were held. At these hearings, the authors of the VC Repon presented their 6ndings, and govemment officiais and members of the public (induding MTBE and methanol producers) had an opponuniry to ask quesrions and present oral testimony. The Tribunal pointed our chat those testifYing, arnongsr others, induded persons alIècted by MTBE water contamination, as weU as individuals associared with the chernical and oil industries, and considered that the testimony reoeived at these public hearings indicated broad-based suppon for the 6nding by the Vniversiry of California chat MTBE usage in gasoline However, if it is true that science and democracy often complement each other, it is also true that science can escape the rraditional checks and balances of democratic govemance, by vinue of both its complexity and the lack of accoumability mechanisms ovec the scientific community.
The restraÏnts imposed by democratic governmems on any fOfm of power cap--able of challenging the scare' s institutions are of viral importance in order to limit the dangers of uncontrolled ,echnological growth. For the /irst time in its histoty, humanity possesses today scientific and ,echnological means powerful enough to lead to its destruction. This is true not only by reference to nudear weaporu and other new militaty technologies, but also in the fidd of environmental pollution, deforestation. and desertification. where new means of production increase the degree of exploitation of the world environment. This is why i, has been said tha, ' we must decide firsr what society wants and needs-then tailor our technology to hdp where it can'," in order to avoid the risk ofbeing ruled by,echnology.86
The nwnerous uncertainties surrounding virtually all new rechnological activities constitute a threat to modem societies that can be faced through the recourse to a series of measures such as the accounrability of science to the public and the obligation ta reveal relevant information. 87 This also raises the issue of which type of democratic principles should be promoted, ie reptesentative democracy and! or panicipatOly democracy controlled by the people' s representatives. Anotber test for tbe precautionary principle's viability in tbe intemarionallegal order is related ta its intrinsic and extrinsic aptitude ta play its raie. Intrinsically, it must play its raie as an original and singular legal technique if it is not to be ovenaken by otber legal techniques. Extrinsically, tbe precaurionary principle must be able to live up ta its societal dimension. If not, it risks being stripped of ail normative legirimacy.
The precautionary principle triggers new reHection on the 'social contract'. It proves thac aIl attempts at social consrructivism (mat is, management of society according ta a linal and preordained plan) are destined to failure, or at least ta serious quesrioning. Precaution brings witb it a new trend: chat of complexity, and tberefore tbe quesrioning of ail absolute assumptions which have long been tbe foundation of modern society. It takes place witbin a post-modern canten, and is tbe bearer of several disturbances in tbe legal order. The litst is tbe remodelling of tbe interaction between law and science. The relativity of Canesian dogma due ta tbe appearance of new problerns and challenges for tbe whole of humanity leads ta a new mode of bandling scientilic expertise by law. Indirecdy, it also leads ta a rebalancing of tbe interaction between legal politics and science. Precaution speaks of a bond prafoundly upset: science wowd be sought for tbe suspicions and doubts it taises ratber tban for tbe knowled.ge Ït offers. 91 This is not a dilution of science, but a repositioning. Indee&, the precautionary principle will crea!e another mode of interaction between normative processes and scientmc expenise. The laner favours a new approach ta law rending rowards normative processes which are consolidaled and renewed by the results obtained through sciemilk expertise hdd on an ongoing basis. This eapertise calis fur a constant adaptation of decision-making processes. This cao be dnne through the adoption of prorocols and arnendments ta existing insouments. 92 The second is the remodeUing of the law/economics inreraction, linked to the cost which precaution could email fur a particular society. Precautionary measures cao initiate a social psychosis which would kiU initiative and innovation.
Societies cannot allow such vagaries. T 0 re-equilibrate the interaction between law and economy, the precautionary principle must he considered as a substantive demem of 'sustainable development'. In chis perspective its objective is no' co bal, economic activity, but ta emphasize the necessity of inlegrating today' s requirements in tenru of environmental protection. As an clement of sustainable development, the precautionary principle must scrive for a 'durable bener-being of humanity'93 in all its interprerations, not just its economic imerpreration. Thereby, the precautionary principle can be the guarantar of activities which are 'economicaliy viable, socially equirable and ecologicaliy sustainable.'94
The precautionary principle aJso requires chat one rethink the interaction between law and effectiveness. In other words, one must red.e6ne effective mechanisms to implemenl and underwrite chis new body oflaw, whose essence is 'soft'. The airn is to avoid veering into the arbitrary or excessive use of ruscretionary power in the appUcation of the principle. Courts and cribunals are therefore asked ta play a fundamenral role in delermining or instiruting the con,ours of the precautionary principle. The objectivization of the elements of this principle mus' depend on a body which will arbitrale between the comraclictoty interests of society's clifferem agents. Through chis objectivization, the precautionary principle will permanendy deserve its tigh' of citi:ren,hip in international law. 94 Ibid, at 27.
